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Gift Encounters: Conceptualizing the
Elements of Begging Conduct
JOE HERMER*
One of Michel Foucault's legacies to socio-legal scholarship is the
way in which his work has provided us with a valuable resource to
explore the relationship between power and law. The later Foucault in
particular, in his writing on Governmentality and the Care of the Self,'
provides us with a language to investigate how we are governed in
everyday life, not just as sovereign subjects to be commanded and con-
trolled in the majesty and authority of law, but how we are ordered in
the production of our own subjectivity through a complex of discourses
and practices, embedded in the mundane and taken-for-granted exper-
iences of everyday life.
One of the challenges of adopting this productive view of power is
how, in retaining an over-arching view of the constitutive nature of dis-
courses, we can nevertheless apply conceptual tools to grasp and under-
stand the spatial and temporal details of specific sites of social
interaction. Indeed, it does seem to me that one of the weaknesses of
much Foucaultian inspired work-which seems allergic to many of the
techniques of mainstream social science for fear of automatically re-
inscribing positivism-is that questions of social agency and reciprocity
are ignored in the impulse to construct a geneaology of particular trajec-
tories of order. In particular, questions of reciprocity-of identity,
memory, obligation and debt-are important with regard to the ways in
which neo-conservative governments are configuring the relationship
between law and regulation, often in forms which many would consider
to be regressive.
In this Article, I focus on conceptualising an ephemeral, mundane
form of interaction which has a significant reciprocal content: the impor-
tuning of pocket change, in the context of charity from one stranger to
another on public sidewalks and streets. Of course, this conduct is most
* Department of Sociology and Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto.
1. See Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self, in TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF: A SEMINAR
WITH MICHEL FOUCAULT (L.H. Martin ed., 1988); Michel Foucault, Govermentality, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller eds.,
1991).
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recognizable as begging or panhandling, and provides a significant
instance of conduct that has been the target of significant regulation in
the last two decades in the United States, Britain and, more recently,
Canada. Indeed, legislation against visibly indigent importuning (in-
cluding squeegee labour) has come to exemplify widespread programs
of "civic sanitation" of homeless and poor populations, and has drama-
tized many of the most divisive controversies inherent in "post-
welfarist" government reforms of criminal justice and social welfare
programs.
I start by turning to the work of Erving Goffman to engage his
notion of "encounter" as a way to begin to conceptualize the dynamics
of passing-by interaction. Dissatisfied with the spatio-temporal narrow-
ness of Goffman's notion of encounter, I re-orient his concept by locat-
ing it within the contradictions of "the gift" to construct a form of
encounter which encompasses the temporal and spatial elements of beg-
ging interaction. I conclude by suggesting the utility of the concept of
the gift encounter for our understanding of how begging is governed and
the character of power that it represents.
II
Erving Goffman has, perhaps more than anyone else, provided us
with a grammar to understand the character of "face to face" interactions
of modern urban life. While Goffman examined a wide range of interac-
tion scenes and institutions, I will instead focus on the narrow (and
underdeveloped) band of his work which specifically deals with pedes-
trian traffic and public space interaction.2
In the opening paragraphs of the third essay in Relations in Public,
"Supportive Interchanges," Goffman notes how Durkheim divided ritual
into two classes, positive and negative.' Positive ritual involves the pay-
ing of homage through offerings of various kinds, while negative rituals
involve interdictions and avoidance, strategies of distancing and staying
away which rely on the control and policing of what Goffman calls the
"territories of the self."4 Goffman noted that in modern society, rituals
with regard to the supernatural have "decayed" and lost their meaning.
"What remains" according to Goffman, "are brief rituals one individual
2. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS: Two STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERACTION
(1961) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS]; ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC PLACES:
NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GATHERINGS (1963) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOUR
IN PUBLIC PLACES]; ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC
ORDER (1971) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC].
3. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE: A STUDY IN
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (The Free Press 1947) (1915).
4. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at 28-61.
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performs for and to another, attesting to civility and good will on the
performer's part, and to the recipient's possession of a small patrimony
of sacredness. What remains, in brief, are interpersonal rituals." 5
These interpersonal rituals of modem life have a dialogistic charac-
ter, which make up a "circle of civility."6 In a telling reference to
Mauss, Goffman suggests that interpersonal rituals involve "prestation"
and "counterprestation," reciprocating conversational gifts and gestures
that together form a "little ceremony."7 To explore these social situa-
tions, Goffman developed the notion of the "encounter" for a "type of
social arrangement that occurs when persons are in one another's imme-
diate physical presence."8 An encounter involves the formation of a "we
rationale," a sense, communicated through expressive signs of "the sin-
gle thing that we are doing at the time."9 Encounters are a form of
"focused interaction"'" where individuals share an interactional sacra-
ment of "eye communion," a shared sense that the self is always depen-
dent on the involvement of the other."
Goffman notes the social norms against stepping outside this "cir-
cle of civility" in public space are so strong, that various forms of lolling
(as compared with loitering) must be masked by various acts of "side
involvement" such as smoking, reading a newspaper or staring at other-
wise unremarkable objects. Goffman cites newspaper reading as an
exemplary form of "civil inattention," a useful prop that allows one to
disengage from others under the cover of legitimate self involvement.' 2
Such strategies allow individuals to excuse themselves from committing
the improper performances of negative rituals, that of "cutting" some-
one, the slighting act of ignoring or denying an encounter overture. The
social norm against "the cut" is, for Goffman, one of the strongest social
taboos in middle class North America. Goffman implies that the avoid-
ance of a cut is a necessary ingredient to the interaction of two parties
who hate one another-a minimal acknowledgement of the other that
stops the scene from breaking down into violence.' 3
Goffman's discussion of pedestrian traffic provides a vivid illustra-
tion of the interactional nature of the "eye communion" of public space,
5. Id. at 63.
6. Id. at 75.
7. Id. at 63. For more information on the work of Marcel Mauss see infra note 29 and
accompanying text infra page 72-83.
8. GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS, supra note 2, at 17.
9. Id. at 18.
10. Unfocused interaction involves a fleeting proximity-such as when two people sitting in
the same room are aware of one another. Id.
11. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at 91.
12. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC PLACES, supra note 2, at 84.
13. Id. at 116.
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in what he refers to as "by-passing" encounters. 14 In passing-by, pedest-
rians signal their intentions while moving, a process that Goffman refers
to as "body gloss," of signaling ones' intentions through a gestural syn-
tax. By providing a "gestural prefigurement" a pedestrian transforms
himself into a sign that can be read by other pedestrian bodies. And, as
Goffman notes, the shell of the human body, unlike that of a car, can
easily be maneuvered out of the way of incoming crashes: pedestrians
can twist, duck, bend and turn sharply, and therefore, unlike motorists,
can safely count on being able to extricate themselves in the last few
milliseconds before impending impact."5 Informal rules are followed in
pedestrian traffic which often appears to 'loosely copy' the formal rules
of road traffic where pedestrians appear to flow in lanes, with the inner-
most part of the street the slowest.1 6 Pedestrians are capable of scanning
for upcoming collisions and conduct a 'body check on themselves' to
assure that, as a passer-by, they are capable of maintaining a 'front'-a
minor adjustment to clothing such as a woman covering her bare shoul-
der, would be a common example.' 7 Oncoming pedestrians engage in a
sort of gestural dialogue, each signaling their course and intentions.' 8
"Streets can nicely provide the ingredients for a character contest. '"19
Goffman posits passing-by encounters as a sort of zero-sum game
of gestures, where a "circle of civility" produces a smooth flow of
unmolested bodies. Goffman sees street scenes such as pedestrian traf-
fic as a syntax of rules which must be obeyed if we are to remain civi-
lized; to break this reciprocating circle is to make oneself vulnerable to
the violence of the modern world, disorder which he depicts the police
as incapable of controlling. "It is inevitable," Goffman suggests, that
citizens must expose themselves both to physical settings over which
they have little control and to the very close presence of others over
whose selection they have little say. "Such settings can bring disease
and injury to those within them. And those present can introduce all of
the basic dangers inherent in co-presence: physical attack, sexual moles-
tation, robbery, passage blocking, importunity, and insult."20
Given the delicate and easily damaged character of interactional
exchange that Goffman posits, it should be little surprise that he views
the activities of importuners such as beggars as a direct threat to this
14. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at xii, 7, 16.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 9.
17. It seems to me that the British are especially attuned to including umbrellas in their body
checks, as a sort of collapsible second skin that can be deployed as an unintentional weapon.
18. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at 13.
19. Id. at 15-16.
20. Id. at 329.
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order, rather than as a constituent part of it. While Goffman says little
directly about the importuning conduct of begging, it seems likely that
he would view beggars in the same way as he does "importuning homo-
sexuals"-as "communication exploiters" who abuse the civil "contact
system" which enables people to remain open to encounter overtures and
maintain a scene of civility.2'
This view of those begging as communication delinquents who
spoil the "eye communion" of public space, is dramatically confirmed
by Goffman in his essay, "Normal Appearances," 2 in which he makes it
clear that beggars are a direct threat to civility. Drawing on a literature
describing pickpockets, grafters, private detectives, secret agents, and
the like, Goffman describes individuals in public space as constantly
exposed and at risk. He conjures up a sphere of vulnerability, where the
pedestrian must be constantly wary of being attacked. In a passage
which Tom Burns has characterised as "bleak and menacing,"2 3
Goffman approvingly quotes L6vi-Strauss, who describes the "grotesque
gestures" of importuning types-beggars, hawkers, peddlers and various
types of touters-in the streets of Calcutta.
The Universal mendicancy is even more profoundly disquieting. One
dare not meet a gaze frankly, for the simple satisfaction of making
contact with another man; the slightest pause will be interpreted as
weakness, as purchase for an importunity... The higher they place
me the greater their hopes that the nothing they ask of me becomes
something.24
Leaving aside the disregard Goffman demonstrates for the histori-
cal and racial dimension of such a comparison, it is disappointing to
realize Goffman's inability to look beyond importuning conduct as a
form of semiotic delinquency. Goffman relies on a Hobbesian view of
human nature, where any pausing to consider the importuning of another
is a weakness which exposes one to disorder and violence.2 5 Remarka-
bly, Goffman fails to understand this importuning scene not simply as
disorder, but as a set of conventions which make up public order; in this
case the accessibility of the "haves" as a legitimate target of the "have-
nots."26 Indeed, it is both ironic and disappointing that Goffman, the
greatest critic of the total institution, which as he reminds us, represents
21. GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC PLACES, supra note 2, at 141-43.
22. See generally GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2.
23. THOMAS BURNS, ERVING GOFFMAN 102 (1992).
24. GoFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at 333 (elision original) (citing LUvi-
Strauss).
25. Marshall Sahlins, The Spirit of the Gift, in THE LOGIC OF THE GIFr: TOWARDS AN ETHIC
OF GENEROSITY 83-84 (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997).
26. BURNS, supra note 23, at 102.
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a form of social control he condemns as nothing less then "grotesque, 2 7
seems blind to the power relations of public space importuning, of the
"grotesque" gestures of the hungry and poor.
At this point, I am going to refrain from carrying on with a critique
of Goffman, and instead focus on the more vital issue: how can we take
Goffman's notion of "encounter" which posits an immediate, zero-sum,
atemporal game of interaction, and re-cast it in such a way that captures
the complexity of importuning conduct-and the relations of power
embedded in such interaction. My strategy is to re-construct Goffman's
concept of encounter by re-casting it within a "sociology of giving,"28
which is concerned with how practices of giving play a central role in
the moral economy of everyday life.
As Mauss notes in his famous essay on the reciprocity of the gift
exchange, the gift can never exist without obligation, without the expec-
tation of first accepting the gift and then returning it.2 9 Of course,
Goffman does draw on the reciprocal nature of the gift in his notion of
encounter.30 But he does so in a narrow way that excludes the act of
material giving and taking between strangers: he reserves the notion of
gift and giving for the intimate and private relations of those who know
one another.3 1 Although Mauss focused specifically on the circle of gift
giving and sacrifice inherent in "archaic societies" (most notably in the
potlatch), he still noted that the cultural expectation of the gift remains
central to the everyday of twentieth century life. "A considerable part of
our morality and our lives themselves are still permeated with the same
atmosphere of the gift, where obligation and liberty intermingle. Fortu-
nately, everything is still not wholly categorized in terms of buying and
selling. '"32
This permeation is perhaps most vividly illustrated by Richard
Titmuss in his brilliant study of blood donation. He describes blood
donation as an institutional web of gift relations which generates a
profound complex of trust and altruism, fusing the politics of welfare
with "the morality of individual wills. '33 We have seen, however, in the
blood contamination scandals in France and Canada during the 1980s,
27. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at 336.
28. See, e.g., HELMUTH BERKING, SOCIOLOGY OF GIVING (1999); THE LOGIC OF THE GIFT:
TOWARDS AN ETHIC OF GENEROSITY (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997).
29. See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES (1990).
30. GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 2, at 63.
31. See id. at 188-237.
32. MAUSS, supra note 29, at 65.
33. RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 12
(1970).
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how this complex can break down within state-sponsored practices of
altruism, with deadly results for the vulnerable.
A central theme of Mauss's work is that the gift makes the person
who accepts it inferior. There is never any such thing as a "free gift,"
Mary Douglas reminds us in her reading of Mauss.34 The gift recipient
is somehow always placed in a context of reciprocity and indebtedness.
The gift of charity can create particular obligations as it involves a
notion of sacrifice by the giver. Mauss notes that "alms are the fruits of
a moral notion of the gift and of fortune on the one hand, and a notion of
sacrifice, on the other."35 "Though we laud charity as a Christian
value," Mary Douglas writes, "we know that it wounds."36 This wound
is at least partially inflicted with the contradiction that those to whom
we feel the most indebtedness-those who give selflessly as a charitable
act-at the same time attempt to place themselves outside the realm of
reciprocity. The evocation of charitable selflessness evokes an even
stronger notion of debt.37 Gift giving can never escape the "logic of
exchange," the expectation that the gift is to be paid back.38 As Alvin
Gouldner argued, the "norm of reciprocity" plays a central role in struc-
turing obligation and responsibility in everyday social relations.39
This paradox is further heightened by the highly visual character of
the gift which evokes an element of unexpectedness and surprise: the
essential quality of the gift as a visual act, as something that has to be
unwrapped, revealed to our eyes for it to be truly real." Gifts are able to
act at a distance for absent givers, often under the sign of apology. Cer-
tainly, the giving of an apology is perhaps the most subtle but wide-
spread example of the paradoxical nature of the gift: apologies allow for
an expression of self-admonishment and wrong-doing which disarms the
moral claim of the victim. In daily encounters, it is still considered poor
manners in all but the most extreme circumstances not to "accept" an
apology when given, even if the apology is not believed to be sincere.
Some commentators, in the wake of the recent conduct of former Presi-
dent Clinton, have suggested that the apology has become a central trope
of political discourse in the late twentieth century.
34. Mary Douglas, Foreward: No Free Gifts, in MARCEL MAUSS, THE Giwr: THE FORM AND
REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES vii (1990).
35. MAUSS, supra note 29, at 17.
36. Douglas, supra note 34, at viii.
37. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Gifts, in THE LOGIC OF THE GIFT: TOWARDS AN ETHIC OF
GENEROSITY 27 (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997) (1844).
38. See generally MAUSS, supra note 29.
39. See generally Alvin. W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity, in FOR SoCIOLoGY:
RENEWAL AND CRITIQUE IN SOCIOLOGY TODAY (1973).
40. Marilyn Strathern, Partners and Consumers: Making Relations Visible, in THE LOGIC OF
THE GIFT: TOWARDS AN ETHIC OF GENEROSITY (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997).
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In exploring the paradoxical character of the gift in his work Coun-
terfeit Money, Derrida draws attention to the linkage between notions of
time and the gift.4 Derrida carries out an analysis of what he calls the
"gift event" where the gift can never exist as an independent act; it must
be part of a field of consciousness that involves memory and debt. "The
gift that cannot be given away ceases to be a gift," comments Lewis
Hyde, a paradox which rests at the heart of the creative process for art-
ists who see their expression as gift-like, yet must still make a material
living: there is nothing in the giving labour of art that will automatically
"make it pay."42 At the same time, the very essence of the gift event as
a selfless, forgotten act is undercut by the act of giving. As Derrida
suggests.
For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange,
countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to
give me back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift,
whether this restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by
a complex calculation of a long term deferral.4 3
It is in this sense that Derrida suggests that Mauss speaks about
everything but the gift.' Prestation, contract, exchange, countergift,
sacrifice-actions that rely on debt and remembering, destroying the
very essence of the gift. Derrida suggests that "the truth of the gift is
equivalent to the non-gift or to the non-truth of the gift."45 The gift is a
temporal "present" which can never be sustained.46
In a position similar to, but distinct from, Derrida's, Bourdieu
points out that the "dual truth" of the gift involves self deception, it is "a
lie told to oneself."47 This dual truth of giving makes the "gift" a deeply
ambiguous, even dangerous event. Bourdieu notes that the gift always
takes place in the temporal context of a counter-gift sometime in the
future, and thus make up a symbolic "gift economy" which acts to struc-
ture relationships of obligation.48 And because the gift is always
expressed in the language of obligation, such giving sets up acts of
"legitimate domination."49 This gift economy is central in the exercise
of symbolic power relations, described by Bourdieu as "power relations
41. JACQUES DERRIDA, GIVEN TIME: I. COUNTERFEIT MONEY (1992).
42. LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 273, xiv
(1979).
43. DERRIDA, supra note 41, at 13.
44. Id. at 24.
45. DERRIDA, supra note 41, at 27.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Pierre Bourdieu, Marginalia-Some Additional Notes on the Gift, in THE LOGIC OF THE
GIFT: TOWARDS AN ETHIC OF GENEROSITY 232, 321 (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997).
48. Id. at 234.
49. Id. at 237.
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that are set up and perpetuated through knowledge and recognition,
which does not mean through intentional acts of consciousness. In order
for symbolic domination to be set up, the dominated have to share with
the dominant the schemes of perception and appreciation through which
they are perceived by them ... they have to see themselves as they are
seen."5o
For Bourdieu, the gift economy plays a central role in the produc-
tion of the symbolic violence of everyday relations. David Cheal draws
on Bourdieu in his study of personal gift giving in Winnipeg, Manitoba.
For Cheal, gifts such as wedding presents and Father's Day cards have
a "free-floating" presence within a "moral economy of interpersonal
relations," and carry out forms of interaction that otherwise are only
weakly institutionalized.5 For Cheal, a "gift economy" is highly moral
in nature, making possible the "extended reproduction of social
relations."52
I propose to expand and re-orient Goffman's notion of encounter to
take account of the "gift economy" and "gift event" which begging con-
duct is a part of. This re-orientation will allow us to escape a narrow
"zero sum", a temporal notion of civility which Goffman constructs.
The concept of the gift encounter encompassses this re-orientation.
Begging does not simply generate an immediate and passing encounter,
but rather is constituted by, and is experienced and regulated within, a
much wider social field of memory, debt, obligation and reciporcity.
Indeed, efforts to control begging can be viewed as fundamentally about
the control of a particularly ambiguous and anxious form of gift giving
that takes place primarily between strangers, between people who have
little personal connection to one another, and who must structure their
fleeting relationship in terms of dominant norms of charity, work, and
feelings of social responsibility. And of course, it is precisely this wider
political field which contextualizes the interaction between the begging
and the begged that has been the target of widespread neo-conservative
reforms in Canada, the United States and Britain.
I define gift encounter as a focused form of social interaction,
occurring in public space, which involves the importuning of an object
from one stranger to another in the context of charity, desert and need.
A gift encounter is constituted by three elements: a) the conduct of the
importuner; b) the conduct of the passer-by; and c) an object importuned
and potentially given and taken. These three inter-related elements
encompass all forms of begging conduct in public space, be it a home-
50. Id.
51. DAVID CHEAL, THE GiF- ECONOMY (1988).
52. Id. at 19.
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less person cadging change, or a licensed collector importuning for a
national charity. Gift encounter elements are shaped and ordered by a
range of social norms and forms of regulation, including laws that
attempt to control or prohibit visibly indigent begging. The central con-
cern of officials in ordering gift encounters is to address the central para-
dox of "the gift", that is to ensure that there is a "re-gift", that something
is given back to the giver in some material form. And it is this concern
with enforcing a contractual form of exchange that is as the centre of gift
encounter governance. The struggle over the control of the gift encoun-
ter is the struggle over the moral character of the re-gift, of the act of
somehow creating a "pay back" for the thing given sometime in the
future.
The struggle over the control of the re-gift can be demonstrated in
the two competing forms of gift encounters which can be considered to
be at opposite ends of a spectrum of importunity in public spaces. At
one end is visibly indigent begging, where the importuner is not capable
of returning a material re-gift. The initial gift is made without the
expectation of return, an act of charity that often involves some sort of
faith in the character of the importuner-that the given object of money,
for example, will not be translated into a morally suspect gift of alcohol
or drugs, but will be spend on food and shelter. Visibly indigent beg-
ging can be considered an open gift encounter, where elements of the
gift encounter are configured in such a way that no stable or visible re-
gift is offered back-the homeless person cannot "pay back" the gift of
pocket change. It is the open character of visibly indigent begging that
has been historically the target of regulation, where the gift encounter
elements are closed in to create some form of re-gift and reciprocity.
The often illegal open gift encounter, considered socially dangerous
because of the lack of reciprocity, can be contrasted with the closed gift
encounter of official charity collections, where the three elements are
licensed to structure an official re-gift to some morally worthy and usu-
ally blameless "absent victim" sometime in the future. A City of Saska-
toon, Canada by-law's definition of "pan-handle" provides a classic
example of this formulation:
"Panhandle" means to beg for or ask for money, donations, goods or
other things of value, without consideration, whether by spoken, writ-
ten or printed word or bodily gesture, but does not include soliciting
for charitable purposes by an organization with permission to do so
from the City.53
Note how this definition encompasses the three gift encounter ele-
53. The Panhandling Bylaw No. 7850, § 3(f), City of Saskatoon, Canada By-Laws (2001),
available at http://www.city.saskatoon.sk.ca/org/clerks-office/bylaws/7850download.doc.
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ments to prohibit open gift encounters to the homeless, while at the same
creating an exception for a gift encounter for an official charity which
can administer a re-gift to a worthy victim. And of course, it is the
possible presence of a visible re-gift that homeless people use as a point
of resistance, often attempting to color their importuning with a demon-
stration of skill, talent, product or service of sort (as a form of "consider-
ation") in the activities of squeegee cleaning, busking and homeless
paper selling.
III
A caution should be immediately registered: a concept is a thematic
and intellectual form of scaffolding which must give way at some point
to a re-oriented or adjusted perspective or idea. Indeed, the most pro-
ductive concepts are those which have a sort of self-destructive quality
to them; they reach beyond themselves in a way that has tremendous
exploratory and descriptive power, yet in doing so the concept itself is
rendered exhausted in a new space of inquiry. With this in mind, a few
tentative suggestions can be made about the possible application of the
gift encounter as a concept for our understanding of the socio-legal char-
acter of begging regulation.
The concept of the gift encounter is useful in laying bare the nor-
mative and discriminatory character of begging governance, dramatized
most vividly in the way in which visibly indigent people are a target of
order and punishment, while official charity collection is constructed as
a legitimate and morally worthy activity which dramatizes a particular
expression of middle class probity. Certainly, when one examines
attempts to govern gift encounters through the configuration of the three
elements to produce a particular re-gift, it is clear that the outlawing and
criminalization of visibly indigent gift encounters is nothing less than a
socially vindictive and disgraceful attack against some of the most
marginalized and desperate people in society who require gifts of pocket
change in order to survive, and, in taking a gift, have nothing material to
give back. Indeed, laws targeting visibly indigent begging can be
viewed as a sign of how neo-liberal contractualism has penetrated the
micro-management of strangers who communicate to one another in the
most fleeting circumstances of public spaces.
For those of us interested in testing the constitutional soundness of
anti-begging legislation, the gift encounter provides a sort of elemental
template to dismantle anti-begging offenct sections, and lay them bare
against a wider social landscape where freedom of expression and a
right to the liberty and security of the person are enshrined civil rights.
In disrupting the taken-for-granted character of how street begging is
2001]
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seen as isolated incidences, the policing of visibly indigent begging can
be clearly linked to wider rationalities of social welfare reform in partic-
ular, where the control of open gift encounters is, for example, enforced
in "welfare to work" initiatives where recipients are presumed to be
work-shy and must be made to "pay back" a "civil" society. Indeed,
current efforts to prohibit visibly indigent begging can be viewed as an
effort to control the compassionate impulses and feelings of the passer-
by, a central theme of vagrancy law since the turn of the nineteenth
century.4 As the celebrated Police Magistrate Patrick Colquhoun stated
in 1806, "begging is a species of extortion to which the tender hearted
are chiefly exposed. 55 And it is this construction of the compassion of
the open gift encounter as a "problem" of government that rests at the
heart of current efforts to control and prohibit visibly indigent begging.
The gift encounter is useful in that it allows us to think in complex
ways about the nature of the relationship between regulation, law, and
power. Gift encounters are the subject of the full majesty of "the law,"
but they are also governed by the most subtle and informal tactics of
order-what I have called elsewhere "technologies of compassion" such
as token or "diverted giving" programs. The public space gift encounter
is a noteworthy example of a historically-specific site of social interac-
tion which is constituted by a complex of discourses and practices. By
conceptualizing the elements of begging conduct, we can avail ourselves
of a conceptual tool to explore a question that Foucault, in his later
work, suggested was key to understanding the nature of modern power:
How shall I conduct myself in relation to the conduct of others?
54. JOSEPH HERMER, POLICING COMPASSION: BEGGING, LAW AND POWER IN PUBLIC SPACES
(forthcoming 2002).
55. PATRICK COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON INDIGENCE, EXHIBITING A GENERAL VIEW OF
NATIONAL RESOURCES OF PRODUCTIVE LABOUR 75 (1806).
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